Abstract
When Kant discusses the comprehensive role of transcendental imagination, he mentions the role of an empirical synthesis, which is the basis of perceptual activity, but if it is based on empirical synthesis then the contradiction of a priori comprehensive ability and empirical synthesis has occurred, and the relationship between active synthesis and passive synthesis of consciousness has now become a problem that must be solved. The description of the association idea has already incorporated the passive synthesis component, which actually provides a solution to this contradiction.
References
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