

Kant's Idea of Association and Passive Synthesis

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Abstract: When Kant discusses the comprehensive role of transcendental imagination, he mentions the role of an empirical synthesis, which is the basis of perceptual activity, but if it is based on empirical synthesis then the contradiction of a priori comprehensive ability and empirical synthesis has occurred, and the relationship between active synthesis and passive synthesis of consciousness has now become a problem that must be solved. The description of the association idea has already incorporated the passive synthesis component, which actually provides a solution to this contradiction.

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1 Introduction

Representation must appear, otherwise it cannot be the object of our knowledge^[1]. Kant considers the heterogeneity manifested in perception as empirical, which makes the theory of comprehensive continuity becomes a difficult problem. Since the perception themselves do not provide an association, the miscellaneous is understood to be decentralized, individual, because only the form of intuition provides this connection. Kant distinguishes the organ senses from the physical connections, and individual senses do not provide a connection of perception, but in the positioning of space, the body provides a combinative role which is neither conceptual nor intuitive. As a subjective and empirical ground, association makes the reproduction of representation possible, and the sequence of perception is also constructed. The perception that Kant discusses here are cognitive, intentional rather than physical, and the perception is

understood as an intentional activity (transcendental psychology). Again, the intensity of things as a quantity of difference, which presupposes the existence of an object.

Now the continuity series of perception and its structure become subjective and can be said to be psychological, in addition the interpretation of the objective continuity of perception is now understood as an analysis of intentional activities, which is also the means of transcendental conception and experience. In contrast, realism is difficult to cohere here, intuition needs to be as an innate condition, although it is only subjective. As Caygill said, association did not play important part in Kant's epistemology, to a large extent Kant's interest in justifying synthetic a priori judgments, and association is a psychological or empirical phenomenon which does not have a prominent place in the transcendental justification of these judgments^[2].

The perceptive content based on the connection of similarity is the ground of the continuity of the sense. The homogeneity of the material in the intuition is the basis of the similarity of the perception. It is that Kant built subjective and empirical things on a congenital conceptual standpoint. It is worth noting that Kant's introduction of the association is to use it as a function of imagination, rather than a perception of connection, and association is the ability to reproduce^[1]. Kant assume a disordered heterogeneity as a single or accidental appearance, in order to establish a connection in a heterogeneous representation without "missing" the heterogeneity, he considers the association establishes the initial continuity. We can also consider the concept of moment in the Expectation of Perception^[1], perception requires the existence of the object so it is empirical, and the moment does not provide a continuity, because it has the amount of difference, only the transcendental imagination can provide continuity.

2 The passive function of Association

Association idea can be divided into three factors: conjunction paired, continuity, and similarity. Association idea connects the heterogeneous representation to the “one” representation, although we may not realize the representation. What is connected here is not a cognitive “representation”, but a “notion” of Locke, or impression of Hume means. If the representation is representation, then it is different from “Vorstellung”. Re-representation is already a backtracking connection, not an initial manifestation. The remnant of representation itself is already an orderly miscellaneous. More, and the disordered hypothesis is based on the logical sequence of cognition, Kant believes that his most important discovery is also there. There must be an imaginary component in the sense. It is the function that the sense itself does not have a connection, and the perception itself is instantaneous. Kant tries to demonstrate an instant perception based on the continuity of time, while continuity is based on imagination. No psychologist has yet thought that the imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception itself. This is partly because this faculty has been limited to reproduction, and partly because it has been believed that the senses do not merely afford us impressions but also put them together, and produce images of objects for which without doubt something more than the receptivity of impressions is required, namely a function of the synthesis of them^[1]. The most important function of the imagination is to make the heterogeneous no longer disordered. The hybrid has its own form in the synthesis. It is also the reason that it does not have the comprehensive function. Because there is no passive synthesis, the comprehensive necessity is the function of initiative, which is especially manifested in the form of intuition of time and space. The most misunderstanding occurs in the confusion of intuition and perception, not the other. Imagination is not just a component of perception, but also the most important component, because imagination introduces the continuity of time. But association idea is not an imaginary. In Kant’s view, the idea of conjunction is an experience, but the imagination is transcendental which is not based on empirical psychology. Heterogeneity is based on the similarity of content. When the content is similar, an uninterrupted transition is continuous, not only the content of the perception is similar, but also the initiative activity itself has this characteristic. For example, the transition between

colors, the transition of red and white patches is based on the fact that they have same category, the color categories, which is different from the transition between sound and color, although red is different from white, since they are all genus of color, and have similarities.

The most important problem is: How is subjective continuity associated with a physical change? It seems that we can only assume the correspondence between impressions and ideas like Hume. Even though the perception is removed from an objective sense, its subjective meaning is not the basis of understanding. In order to oppose Berkeley and Hume’s empiricism, the relationship between perception and experience cannot be used as a starting point for inevitable knowledge. But where is the subjectivity of this kind coming from? In spite of a kind of innate objectivity proves the validity of subjectivity, it does not explain the source of subjectivity itself. Kant also regards objectivity comes from the object and regards it as experience. The continuity of content can only be regarded as a kind of perceived continuity, not an original conjunction. It is determined as the interrelationship of the connection order in time rather than the external movement, especially in Kant’s inner sense theory. The way to continue, as an empirical synthesis, association, connection and continuity of content is not a logical relationship of the sense, but a minimum degree of integration. The continuity of quantity should be seen as the pure form of this action (axiom of intuition), and the intuitive behavior is already a sort of miscellaneous, it is already a form of synthesis, just as the lowest form it appears seems to be subjective. Since the different content is not a condition, the perception must be a conscious sense, not an unconscious. Therefore, Kant said that there must be an imaginary component, and this means that time is the basis of perception. Although Kant regards time as form of intuition, it is a formal condition of sense, and it is also a comprehensive condition. The form itself provides content, and this is new content that is different from the perceived content. The content of the activity itself, such as quantity and quality. As a rule, association idea first negates the disorderly miscellaneous, the law of association is this: empirical ideas that have frequently followed one another produce a habit in the mind such that when one idea is produced, the other also comes into being^[3].

3 The features of Association: minimal synthesis

Hume’s concept of habit is already a description of the

rules, he has established the initial basis of continuity, although it is only a subjective rule. Habit is neither causality, nor accidental. The habit is a subjective experience. Kant admits a vague, unclear representation in anthropology, but this is obviously not related to his theory of relations, perception can only be the consciousness, only the sense of being realized is perception, and this means that the perception can only be understood as a point of continuation, Kant does not accept the amount of infinitely small differences in micro-perception, even if the perception is subjective it also needs to be realized, because the association lies in the time as the inner senses. This conclusion cannot be seen as being derived entirely from the subjective relevance of sense, but as from the logical relevance of the senses.

Only in this way can we explain why Kant does not accept the sights and fields of perception. Perception is not the attention to things, or the object is abstracted from a field of view and recognized as an object. The empirical object as an object is always continuous in time, especially causal association, which is the object's nature. But in terms of the similarity and continuity of content, association is not a logical activity. This is different from the logical description of identity, similarity and continuity^[4]. For Kant, the object of experience is actually a physical object, especially a mechanical, mathematical object, so the field of view is actually a mechanical relationship, perception that it is not what appears in the field of intentionality lies in his negative view of empirical psychology. His concept of phenomena and phenomenological phenomena are completely different from Husserl's Phenomenology.

In Husserl's view, intentionality is both sensational and categorical, and this is unaccepted by Kant. Although Kant considers the body make the role in our perception of spatial objects, especially our perception in orientation of space is dependent on our body, but for category, this subjectivity is eventually replaced by transcendental form. Association idea, in terms of this subjective association, which is obviously not enough for Kant, because the possibility of subjectivity itself is only regarded as experience that could not prove necessity in our knowledge. In Husserl, association obtaining a basic general theory of subjectivity, the most important thing is that association is not a kind of logic or a relationship based on logical relations. Association is still the relevance of content, whether it is understood as an original passive field, or as a kind

of initiative, it does a connection. According to Hume's understanding, this is to link from one object to another. This is also Kant's main position on association idea. How to establish the relationship from A to B, from subjectivity and objectivity is Kant's main work, even though he accepts the category of relationship is more fundamental, rather than explaining it from a qualitative perspective.

However, in terms of the function of association, Kant did not clearly distinguish it from memories or imaginations, that is, reproductive imaginations, especially their analysis of the composition of perception. Imagine that although it is an essential component of sensation, it is necessary to distinguish the difference between the composition of productive imagination and the composition of reproductive imagination. Kant made a distinction between memory and reproductive imagination in his anthropology. Memory is distinguished from the mere reproductive power of imagination in that it is able to reproduce the former representation voluntarily, so that the mind is not a mere plaything of the imagination^[3].

As far as association idea is concerned, it is related to the recall of the past state and to a foresight of the future state. Basically, association idea can be understood as a kind of original synthesis, rather than a logical association. For the entire sequence of perception (the object), the power of the association's representation should be understood as an inevitable rule, but not a causal relationship. For the continuity of representation, it reconciles memories and expectations, but this is only because it is an empirical condition. The homogeneity or difference of continuous content should be used as a constituent scene of association. As far as one object is related to another object, they are not established on the principle of difference, but are established on the basis of similarity. Difference is not a process of association between homogeneity and heterogeneous content. On the contrary, homogeneity and heterogeneity are the result of association, in terms of difference, it is not now a degree difference, but as association of scenes connected based on similarity.

In this regard, as the basis of the lowest subjectivity, association idea actually provides the conditions for the appearance of all our sensation. But for empirical psychology, the rules provided by association idea, as a psychological habit, does not provide a ground for an objective knowledge. Kant thinks so in the B version of Critique of Pure Reason, it is different from the

A version^[1]. On the basis of this, the triple synthesis provides a description of the structuring activities of consciousness^[5]. Association idea can be seen as playing a role in the intuitive form of time. It is the continuity of association that makes the content similar and is organized as an intuitive content in time, that is, it transforms from an empirical (pre-judged) relationship to an intuitive quantity that can be combined with logic. Obtain an objective meaning in the form of time and space. Kant understands intuition as transcendental, while association (imagination) is understood as experience because it depends on the object rather than the representation. Therefore, we should understand association idea that is an inevitable duty^[6].

Kant is basically critical of the idea of the association especially in B version, he understands the miscellaneous as something that needs to be given order, and requires an intuitive quantitative description. But association itself does not have this ability. From here, we can see that the miscellaneous is not a kind of individual disordered heterogeneity of a sense. In the intuition of time and space, the miscellaneous “as” miscellaneous is already an intuitive content of experience. The synthesis of the miscellaneous presupposes the intuition of time, even though we call the material of perception as miscellaneous that is already synthesized by association. In this respect, the synthesis of the comprehension is not the passive view of the association which is different from Husserl’s passive synthesis and is already an initiative^[7].

4 Conclusion

Our discussion is based on the lowest continuity, and the association are not fully explained in terms of Kant’s imaginative rules, because it is not only the object of perception, for example the visual field of perception, which participates in the composition of

perception as a non-conceptual content. Kant denies the role of micro-perception, so it is impossible for us to perceive objects in a field or gestalt. In a sense, this problem is the relationship between the part and the whole of the representation. But it can be said that Kant understands the relationship in the sense of the regeneration of imagination. The imagination can actually be regarded as the field or gestalt of our perception. It is not the association of the original passive, but a combination of initiative, especially it requires the concept of logic to achieve the grasp of the sense. Time and space as a comprehensive condition is the synthesis of initiation, rather than a passive association rule (Husserl). Kant’s synthesis of intuition includes the synthesis and association idea. In fact, the form of time is not in the sense that the idea is laid for the joint idea, the formal condition of time is not a basis for occurrence, and the idea of synthesis is the result of association idea.

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