Keywords
Consequentialism
Deontology
Virtue ethics
Submitted : 2025-01-19
Accepted : 2025-02-03
Published : 2025-02-18
Abstract
With the rapid progress of technology, the decision-making and behaviors of artificial intelligence have begun to shift from external settings to internal development. Intelligent agents gradually possess varying degrees of adaptive, decision-making, and behavioral abilities, and their autonomous capabilities are continuously enhanced. For moral considerations, artificial intelligence with autonomous decision-making and behaviors has begun to be regarded as a moral agent. Therefore, how traditional morality can play an autonomous role in intelligent technologies has become a problem that must be faced. The three main theories of normative ethics, consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics all have the potential to solve this problem. This article aims to use normative ethical theories to construct an artificial intelligence system capable of making moral decisions, and it is necessary to ensure that the autonomous reasoning of artificial intelligence can be constrained by human social morality and values, remain consistent with human values, and assume the “responsibility” of decision-making.
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