Keywords
Excess energy saving
Non-cooperative game theory
Bargaining model
Submitted : 2021-07-31
Accepted : 2021-08-15
Published : 2021-08-30
Abstract
Energy saving income distribution mode is of great significance to the energy industry. With the continuous application of new technologies, the problem of excess energy saving income distribution has become one of the obstacles to the appreciation of energy performance. At present, the distribution of risk and income is mainly based on the contribution of risk and income, which has some limitations. The benefit distribution of energy saving negotiation between energy saving service companies and clients can be regarded as a bargaining process where an effective range satisfying both parties can be obtained. This provides a new perspective in solving the problem of excess energy saving income distribution in energy management contract projects.
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