Keywords
Livestock enterprises
Evolutionary game
Willingness constraint
Submitted : 2025-06-14
Accepted : 2025-06-29
Published : 2025-07-14
Abstract
The livestock farming is an important pillar of the rural economy in China. To explore the impact of government technical subsidies and pollution penalties on the digital and intelligent transformation of livestock enterprises, an evolutionary game theoretical model between the government and livestock enterprises is constructed. The interaction mechanism of the game between the government and breeding enterprises is explored, and simulation is conducted. The research results show that the combined strategy of pollution penalties and technical subsidies is the optimal strategy for the government; the system is jointly driven by government subsidies, technical costs of transformation input, public willingness, and enterprise willingness.
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